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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  expansion  of  intensive  livestock  farming,  especially  the  construction  of  mega  stables,  is  highly  con-
tested  in  the  Netherlands.  In this  context,  local  authorities  try to  make  decisions  about  situating  mega
stables  on  their  territory  by  balancing  out various  interests.  However,  many  become  entangled  in  esca-
lating  processes  and  lose  the  trust  of both  citizens  and  farmers.  On  the  basis  of  an  evaluation  of  a
decision-making  process  about  a mega  stable  project  in a small  Dutch  town,  this  article  analyzes  why
distrust  occurs  and  what  local authorities  could  do to prevent  this.  In-depth  interviews  and  participant
observations  show  how  different  conﬁgurations  of  stakeholders  became  ﬁxed  in  their own  convictions,
values,  and  fears,  resulting  in  mutual  annoyances,  misunderstandings,  blaming,  and,  ﬁnally,  distrust.  Theega stable
ntensive farming
overnance
ecision making
more information  public  ofﬁcials  provided  to dispel  doubts  about  the  mega  stables,  the  more  citizens
started  to distrust  the  local  government.  Trust  is  not  enhanced  by more  information  and  transparency
alone.  The  paper  concludes  that,  once  a decision-making  process  escalates  and  distrust  arises,  it is very
difﬁcult  to revitalize  the process  and  regain  trust.  The  paper offers  suggestions  on  governance  actions
that  could  help  prevent  spirals  of distrust
© 2013 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsevier B.V.
 All rights reserved.. Introduction
.1. Mega stables
The expansion of the intensive livestock sector is highly con-
ested in the Netherlands. Since the 1990s, the political debates
bout intensive farming have been dominated by issues such as
nvironmental pollution, animal diseases, animal welfare, land-
cape impairment, and human health risks [1]. These debates chal-
enge the traditional economic style of reasoning that used to dom-
nate the agricultural policy arena during the post-Second World
ar  era [2–4]. During that era, strong, coherent groups of farmers’
ssociations, policymakers, credit institutions, consultants, scien-
ists, and cooperatives were working together to gain agricultural
elf-sufﬁciency by increasing bulk production, innovation, and
ationalization. In the 1970s and 80s, their successes resulted, how-
ver, in negative side effects in terms of production surpluses and
nvironmental pollution, for which they were criticized and to
hich they had to respond. During the 1990s, the sector was addi-
ionally scrutinized for animal welfare problems and landscape
ollution [5]. Despite the attempts of farmers and researchers to
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: ++31 317 484234.
E-mail address: Gerard.Breeman@wur.nl (G. Breeman).
573-5214/$ – see front matter ©  2013 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2013.05.004respond to these criticisms by developing innovative, sustainable,
and animal friendly husbandry systems, many citizens and interest
groups remained negative about intensive farming [5–7]. Conse-
quently, now, in the second decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, local
governments are hesitant to support intensive livestock farming,
and they are reluctant to approve the construction of new mega
farms [6].
In this article, we analyze the decision-making process around
a particular type of mega farm in a small town in the Netherlands.
This so-called New Mixed Company (NMC) was  developed as a sys-
tem innovation that could accommodate 3,700 sows, 9,700 pigs,
19,700 hogs, 1,200,000 chicks, and 74,000 chickens and would have
its own  fermentation installation, hatchery, and abattoir [8–10].
Supporters of this project argued that this mega farm would be
innovative, environmentally friendly, energy-sustainable, animal
friendly, and would ﬁt very well with the surrounding landscape
[9,11]. However, once the farmers set out to build this type of
farm and sought support from the local government, they became
involved in a problematic policymaking process. The farmers and
local authorities were confronted with ﬁerce protests and emo-
tional reactions from local citizens, including a local family doctor
who highlighted the potential health risks of the mega farm.
Despite additional research, information gatherings, and consul-
tation workshops, the local policymakers became entangled in
escalating processes in which they lost the trust of both their
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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itizens and the farmers. In this article, we disentangle how this
ame about.
.2. The problem of trust
The problem we are analyzing is more than a local conﬂict of
nterests between farmers who want to build a new mega stable
nd a group of citizens who does not want to have a mega farm in
heir village. Our case study is a symptom of a structural problem of
rust in government. If society turns power over to a government to
ake authoritative decisions, citizens have to trust that the govern-
ent will decide and act in favor of the public interest [12 cited in
3, p9]. And, when doing so, the government may  fulﬁll certain pri-
ate interests, deny others, and change its policies for the sake of the
ublic interest. The problem is, however, that this is sometimes not
asy for citizens to accept if their interests are unﬁlled, neglected,
r damaged by changing policies. In other words, if a government is
aking a speciﬁc stand in a situation of conﬂicting interests on the
rounds of the public interest, this also calls into question its trust
elation with its citizens. Analyses of multi-stakeholder delibera-
ions on issues of local rural planning where actors have different
nterests have shown already how easily citizens lose their trust in
overnment if their interests are unfulﬁlled or neglected [14].
This problem of trust in government has received much atten-
ion, especially as part of the increasing uncertainties in a (post-)
odern society. Different sources of uncertainties make it hard to
now what to expect and to trust [15]. First, it is not at all clear
hat the public interest is. Government itself is a mix  of different
ctors with different interests. Second, the speed and the growing
mount of information and disinformation available in the media
dd to the level of uncertainty in society. Third, the continuously
hanging network of stakeholders and the shifting content of policy
ssues give a feeling of being in a state of permanent uncertainty
16–18]. And ﬁnally, the different social roles, reﬂecting different
nterests, makes the uncertainty complete because it is not clear
hat actors should expect from one another [15]. An alderman
n a local community is for instance no longer just a policymaker,
ut also a facilitator, a public entrepreneur, a knowledge broker, a
risis manager, a resident, a protector of citizens’ safety, a former
armer, a member of a political party, or, to some, a supporter of
peciﬁc interests. Much of the academic work on trust focuses on
ow to deal with these uncertainties without losing trust [19–22].
ublic administration scholars analyze in particular how citizens’
nvolvement can enhance public trust and improve government
erformances[19,23].
Making trustworthy public policies in the (post-) modernist
ontext of uncertainties is generally already not easy; making
rustworthy policies about controversial subjects such as the
onstruction of an NMC  may  be even more difﬁcult. Important
ncertainties about the nature of the risks and beneﬁts of new
ntensive livestock systems, such as the NMC, will persist. In
ddition, the many actors involved bring with them a variety of
nterests, values, and perceptions, leading to fundamental contro-
ersies. It is not just a matter of balancing different interests and
hoosing what is good for the public interest. There are different and
onﬂicting expectations about policies and policymakers. Almost
very government action can be perceived as the fulﬁllment of a
esire of one party and a disappointment to another. It is therefore
ot surprising that governments have trouble in maintaining trust
15], although not every controversy or conﬂict of interests results
n citizens’ distrust..3. Research question
Our research question is: how does a local government win
nd lose citizens’ trust during decision-making processes about thenal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 39– 47
construction plans for intensive farming companies and what could
it do to prevent distrust? To analyze this question, we  combined dif-
ferent strands of literature and developed a theoretical framework
by addressing two theoretical questions. First, what is trust and
when do citizen start trusting or distrusting local policymakers?
And second, how is trust shaped and reshaped in the interactions
between them? For the ﬁrst question, we build mainly on theories
of Putnam [19], O‘Neill [22], Searle [24,25], and Möllering [20]. To
analyze the interactional context of trust, we  borrow from the con-
ﬁguration theory [26,27] inspired by the social psychologist Weick
[28,29].
In Section 2, we introduce the theoretical framework. Section 3
describes the research design and the methods used. In Section 4,
we present the results of our research, including suggestions about
how governments could prevent distrust. Section 5 concludes this
article.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. The concept of trust
We  deﬁne trust as a mental state of expecting something favor-
able [30–32]. This means that if someone trusts another person, he
has a favorable expectation about that other person. Hence, trust
is a mental state that is always targeted either at a person or at an
object or state of affairs around us, and this mental state attributes
something to that person, object, or state of affairs [24,25,32]. Usu-
ally, it is assumed that trust is aimed at people, but it can also be
targeted at something abstract such as the legal system, or, as in
our case, the policy plans of the municipality [33,34]. Furthermore,
trust functions in relation to numerous other mental states such as
beliefs, desires, fears, joy, shame, hate, and so on [24,25]. A farmer
has different beliefs and desires about what it means to live in a
rural area than, for instance, a school teacher who is living in the
same town. These beliefs and desires in turn inﬂuence what they
expect from the local policymakers. Since every individual has a
different background of mental states, trust is subjective and per-
sonal. What to some people seem good reasons for trusting may be
bad reasons to others [20]. In our case, we  are interested in how
farmers and citizens came to trust and distrust policies and local
policymakers.
How does trust help us to cope with uncertainties? [15,35].
Basically, trusting means that we do not have to put all possi-
ble uncertain scenarios in writing–if indeed that were possible;
instead, if we trust, we simply act as if there are no uncertain-
ties. Thus, if people trust, they are not entirely certain, but act as
if they are certain. They sidestep, or, as Möllering [20,21] puts it,
they suspend uncertainties. ‘Suspension, then, can be deﬁned as the
mechanism that brackets out uncertainty and ignorance, thus mak-
ing interpretative knowledge momentarily “certain” and enabling
the leap of trust’ [36 cited in 20, p244]. Distrust then comes about if
people do not take that leap of trust, but, on the contrary, emphasize
the uncertainties and even search for more uncertainties.
People only sidestep uncertainties if they, in their own  minds,
have sufﬁcient reasons to do so. Whether they have sufﬁcient rea-
sons is determined by their own subjective interpretations and
based on all kinds of other mental states they have obtained
through previous experiences [20]. For trusting, there is no need
for others to agree with the reasons a person gives to trust some-
thing or somebody. Neither is it necessary for one’s reasoning to be
based on rational argumentation, though it could be. Taking a leap
of trust may  very well be based on certain emotional arguments.
In the end, it is only up to the individual who believes that he has
good reasons to trust [20]. This means that winning someone’s trust
involves making arguments or doing something that is appealing to
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protest group, we traced back all events and interactions in relation
to the process. The purpose was to both describe the history of the
policy process and to identify the interactions and arguments usedG. Breeman et al. / NJAS - Wageninge
hat person [32]. Trustees need encouragements to suspend uncer-
ainties and take the leap into trust. This is especially relevant when
omplex questions with high levels of uncertainty are involved. If,
owever, these encouragements, arguments, and actions are not
ppealing and do not match with previously gained experiences,
he result could be the reverse: rising suspicion and distrust.
.2. Shaping trust and distrust in conﬁgurations
Although trust is subjective, and based on previously acquired
ental states, trust is not obtained in isolation. On the contrary,
specially in uncertain situations, people look for other people
o interpret what is going on [37]. They will try to ﬁnd common
rounds, exchanging their expectations, forming new ones, and
hanging existing ones. How people do this, is, to our mind, a matter
f interpretation [20], interaction, and framing [38]. Interpretations
f situations, plans, and behavior are not limited to an individual’s
rivate understanding but are constructed and reconstructed in
nteraction processes [28,29,38]. In interaction, people ‘negotiate’
n the meaning they give to their surroundings: what is happening,
hat do we think of it, what do we not know yet, what does it mean
or our actions, which persons can we rely on, what is the public
nterest here, which outcomes do we expect, and so on [37]. Hence,
e argue that mental states, such as expectations, take shape dur-
ng processes of framing. Although this connection between mental
tates and framing is rare, Pacherie [39] argues that people develop
hared mental states through processes of framing.
In addition, we use conﬁguration theory to understand how
eople cluster into groups through interaction and framing pro-
esses. Here, we deﬁne a conﬁguration as a group of people with
n intensive interaction pattern and shared frames [26]. However,
onﬁgurations do not only arise because people develop shared
rames in interactions; they also arise because people tend towards
ther people with similar backgrounds, assumptions, and, in our
ords, similar mental states, such as expectations. It is a causal cir-
ular process in which a group of people produces content and vice
ersa content produces a group. In the end, they develop a similar
et of mental states and thus they are likely to trust the same kind
f plans, objects, and persons. Conﬁgurations do not have to corre-
pond to existing divisions such as organizations, departments, or
eighborhoods. They are not pre-coded beforehand but are derived
mpirically. For example, persons from local government may  be
nvolved in other different conﬁgurations.
During framing processes, actors could ﬁnd one another in
onstructing shared expectations. However, in complex policy
rocesses with many uncertainties this is not a straightforward
rocess. On the contrary, when policymakers are dealing with
ncertainties, they may  trigger a spiral of distrust, for three rea-
ons. First, policymakers may  use arguments that are convincing
o them for trusting a policy plan, but these very same arguments
ould make actors from other conﬁgurations, with other mental
tates, only suspicious. If encouragements are wrongly expressed
r arguments are insufﬁcient, policymakers could start highlighting
ncertainties and spreading suspicion, instead of causing a leap into
rust [32]. Second, policymakers could try to reduce the number of
ncertainties by simplifying the number of problem frames and
nterpretations, so as to control the situation better. Consequently,
he involved stakeholders could feel excluded or at least that they
re not being taken seriously. They could start accusing the policy-
akers of being biased and ‘when confronted with this bias, actors
re likely to feel hurt and disrespected and withhold their trust in
uthorities, policy-making procedures and institutions’ [14, p410].
nd thirdly, the positions between policymakers and the other
nvolved actors could evolve into ﬁxations because conﬁgurations
ave the tendency to become increasingly closed: ‘Through a pro-
ess of interaction, members of a community come to use the samenal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 39– 47 41
or similar cognitive mechanisms, engage in the same or similar acts
and use the same or similar language to talk about thought and
action. Group processes reinforce these, often promoting internal
cohesion as an identity marker with respect to other communities’
[40, p237]. The consequence is that the interpretations become so
ﬁrmly established that people are no longer capable of reﬂecting
on them. In such cases, we talk of ﬁxations [27,41]. The embedded-
ness of these ﬁxations in conﬁgurations complicates attempts to
unblock these ﬁxations and results in a further perseverance and
hardening of distrust.
3. Research design and methods
This article aims to understand how local governments win and
lose citizens’ trust. From our theoretical framework we suspected
that, during the policymaking process about the mega stable, dif-
ferent conﬁgurations would exchange arguments and interact in
such a way that they would become closed and ﬁxated in their
own interpretations, resulting in a spiral of distrust.
The sub-questions therefore are:
1. Which conﬁgurations were involved in the entire decision-
making process?
2. Which arguments did local government use to convince and how
did these arguments match with the different conﬁgurations?
3. How did the different interactions and arguments evolve in the
escalation of distrust?
4. What can policymakers do to avoid losing trust?
The ﬁrst sub-question is based on an actor analysis. Starting with
the core actors in the decision-making process, we  did a snowball
analysis, identifying who mentioned who. This analysis was com-
plemented with an actor analysis about who were mentioned in
the formal decision-making procedure, such as civil servants from
the regional level. An essential part was to analyze the interaction
patterns between these actors and to identify what the different
actors expected from the policy plans and the policymakers.
The spatial planning process for the construction of the inten-
sive farming areas started in July 2004 at provincial level. The town
council discussed the NMC  plans for the ﬁrst time in November
2006 and from then until February 2008 the interactions between
farmers, citizens, and the policymakers that are central in our anal-
yses took place. We  conducted our research between April 2008
and the summer of 2009.
To achieve our objectives, we  held 17 in-depth interviews with
actors from the local government (5), local protest organizations
(4), farmers (3) and their associations (1), national (1) and regional
civil servants (2), and a politician (1). We  also held 17 short on-
street interviews with local citizens in front of a supermarket to
ascertain their perspective on the building plans. All these inter-
views and observations were audiotaped (with the participants’
permission), typed out verbatim, and analyzed using Atlas.ti.1 This
exercise produced ﬁve conﬁgurations.
The goal of the second question is to reconstruct the entire
decision-making process. To do this, we  applied a backward
mapping strategy [42]. Using the interviews, formal documents,
websites, weblogs, and ﬁles of the municipality, the province, the
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality, and the local1 The interview questions, interviewees, and the historic reconstruction are avail-
able on request.
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etween the different conﬁgurations. During the in-depth inter-
iews, we discussed the decision-making process, the interactions
n which the interviewees were involved, and the inﬂuence they
elieved they had had on the decision-making process. We  particu-
arly focused on all the interactions, meetings, and communications
etween citizens, farmers, and the policymakers about the NMC  in
he period November 2006 to April 2008.
The third question aims at understanding how the interactions
nd the arguments that were exchanged between the different
onﬁgurations led to increasing distrust. Here, we used the afore-
entioned 17 interviews again and complemented this part of the
esearch by observing seven meetings between the municipality
nd the interest groups to discuss the policy. We  used a hermeneu-
ical approach in which the theory on trust and distrust is applied
o the empirical material. This approach contains an iterative inter-
retative process where small pieces of texts are used to make sense
f larger pieces of texts, and vice versa [32,43]. ‘The part can only
e understood from the whole, and the whole only from the parts
 . . you begin, for example, in some part, try tentatively to relate
t to the whole, upon which new light is shed, and from here you
eturn to the part studied, and so on’ [44,p54]. We interpreted the
rguments of the different conﬁgurations, and the reception and
eply to these arguments by other actors, and concluded whether
r not uncertainties were sidestepped or highlighted.
To answer our fourth question, we brought all our ﬁndings
ogether, made an interpretation of the mechanisms of trust and
istrust, and formulated six strategies to prevent distrust. Finally,
e presented the results of our ﬁndings and discussed them with
ll the interviewees and all the public ofﬁcials involved.
. Results
.1. Conﬁgurations
Which conﬁgurations were involved in the entire decision-
aking process? On the basis of our analysis, as mentioned in
ection 3, we distinguished ﬁve: 1. New Mixed Company (NMC) as
ega sustainable;  2. Mega stable as mega wrong;  3. Innovative, sus-
ainable mega company in our area; 4. No mega stable in our area;
nd 5. Just follow the procedures.  In this section, we describe which
ctors belong to each conﬁguration, their expectations concerning
he NMC  concept–that is, whether they trust or distrust the ideas
f an NMC–and how they frame their expectations.
.1.1. NMC  as mega sustainable
Actors belonging to this conﬁguration fully trust the ideas of the
MC. They frame the NMC  as a sustainable combination of live-
tock breeding, crop cultivation, manure processing, and energy
roduction. The concept is related to the idea of cradle-to-cradle,
hich means that they aim for a closed ecosystem without any
aste production [45]. They argue that the NMC  is much more
ustainable than ‘just any other mega stable. As long as people
ant to eat meat and we want that meat to be sustainable, then
he NMC  is the way to go’ (interview, local government ofﬁcial 5).
his conﬁguration is not bound to a speciﬁc region and consists of
esearchers, scholars, agricultural entrepreneurs, and public ofﬁ-
ials. They have been developing and promoting the NMC concept
t national and international level for about ten years as a promis-
ng ground-breaking systems innovation that would replace the
ontinuous improvement of traditional farm concepts [11,46,47]
.1.2. Mega stable as mega wrong
Actors within this conﬁguration are against the development
f mega stables, downgrading them by using frames such as ‘pig
ats’ or ‘industrial farming’ and ‘the invasion of pigs’ (various NRC
andelsblad news articles). In their view, it is unethical to hold thisnal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 39– 47
number of animals in such a small area. Expansion of the inten-
sive livestock sector causes unjustiﬁed and unknown health risks
to animals and humans. They believe that mega stables are a threat
to the small family farm and to the reputation of the entire sector.
They highlight the uncertainties and the unknown consequences of
the NMC  and thus they are very distrustful towards everything to
do with NMCs. This conﬁguration consists of members of national
political parties, animal activists, and environmental groups. Some
public ofﬁcials working in the agricultural sector should also be
considered as part of this conﬁguration.
4.1.3. Innovative, sustainable company in our area
Actors in this conﬁguration welcome the establishment of the
innovative, sustainable mega company in their region. They have
high expectations of the NMC, believing that it would be beneﬁcial
if they were the ﬁrst to build this innovative and unique enterprise.
They use frames such as ‘The local community beneﬁts immediately
from the NMC’ (interview local government 1). The construction of
the NMC  ﬁts very well with their ambitions for the region and for
agribusiness. They also argue that, if the NMC  is not built, it is likely
that other, less sustainable mega companies will be built there any-
way. This conﬁguration is regionally embedded, with the local and
provincial governments as the most important actors. In our case,
the local government, represented by the alderman responsible for
agricultural matters, belongs to this conﬁguration.
4.1.4. No mega stable in our area
The actors in this conﬁguration are against the construction of a
mega stable in their area, displaying typical Not-In-My-Backyard
behavior (NIMBY)[48]. It is not the mega stable concept that is
problematic, but the location. They distrust the plans to construct
an NMC  and highlight time and again the negative consequences
of the NMC  for their town. To them, the landscape should remain
‘open’ and not obstructed with large, ugly, concrete high-rise sta-
bles. They frame the issue as: ‘I am afraid for the future.  . . we have
such a beautiful landscape and should preserve that’ (interview civil
servant 2). They believe that the health risks for those living close
to the stables are too great. Besides, they emphasize that the NMC
is not the only project that will be spoiling their nice town; they
have already seen the advent of a sand-processing installation and
an intensive greenhouse area. The NMC  is simply the ‘last straw
that broke the camel’s back.’ This conﬁguration consists of mem-
bers of the village community association, the local protest group,
and a large number of the village’s inhabitants. Also, the opposition
parties on the city council belong to this conﬁguration.
4.1.5. Just follow the procedures
Procedural rationality is predominant in this conﬁguration. They
believe that, as long as the initiators of the NMC  comply with the
rules and legislation, there should be no problems. Their trust is in
the legal procedures. They are conﬁdent that the construction of the
NMC  is in line with national and European Union programs: ‘if it ﬁts
within the legal procedures, then, yes, it is ﬁne with me’  (interview
civil servant 2 province). However, in their view, the local govern-
ment remains politically responsible for the consequences of the
NMC, even though the NMC  would have consequences across the
borders of the municipality. This conﬁguration consists mainly of
civil servants from the regional and national government.
4.2. Interactions and tensions between conﬁgurations
Which arguments did the local government use to convince and
how did these arguments match with the different conﬁgurations?
As described above, the actors in the ﬁve conﬁgurations had dif-
ferent expectations about the NMC. All groups had learned and
cultivated a certain line of reasoning and interpreting that made
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ense to them, and throughout the entire decision-making process
hey stuck to these and developed ﬁxated beliefs. This resulted in
trong controversies, in many conﬂictive meetings, and time and
gain in misunderstandings and tensions.
The tensions between the local supporters, that is, the conﬁgura-
ion Innovative, sustainable mega company in our area, and the local
pponents of the mega stables–No mega stable in our area–were the
ost serious ones. From very early on, the conﬁguration Innova-
ive, sustainable mega company in our area believed strongly in the
conomic and environmental beneﬁts of the NMC, as advocated
y the conﬁguration NMC  as mega sustainable.  The agricultural
ntrepreneurs and supporting scholars gave many reasons in favor
f the mega stable, and these reasons ﬁtted very well with the
iews and beliefs of the local government. Their arguments were
specially welcomed by the relevant alderman. He used to be an
gricultural entrepreneur and understood the arguments in favor
f mega stables. In other words, the reasons provided in favor of
he NMC  fell on fertile ground with the local government.
Somewhat to the surprise of the local government however,
any other stakeholders from the conﬁguration No mega stable in
ur area did not share this positive attitude. This local conﬁgura-
ion was supported by the national conﬁguration Mega stable as
ega wrong. Although these citizens did not oppose mega stables
n general, they feared the expected negative local site effects. They
eared, for example, that the new mega farm would result in a lot
f extra trafﬁc because they believed that the supply trucks would
rive through their village to the farm site. They also feared that the
ega stable would produce small dust particles that would dam-
ge the health of those living close to the mega farm. All attempts
o reconcile these fears and propose solutions, such as a new road
rafﬁc plan or the installation of a hi-tech air-washing facility on
he rooftop of the stables, were in vain.
The tensions between NMC  as mega sustainable and Mega sta-
le as mega wrong had already been visible at national level for a
ong time. At local level however, tensions became manifest rather
ate in the decision-making process because the plans were ini-
ially general and vague. Just a few very well-informed citizens
ttended the early information gatherings and workshops. The cit-
zens’ involvement and protests began only when the building
lans became more concrete. This was also the point at which sev-
ral politicians from the opposition parties and citizens organized
hemselves in a local protest group. Still, government representa-
ives kept on trying to win trust by using the same arguments that
ad been so convincing to them. They communicated, for instance,
he view that the project was sustainable and innovative, and that
t would create new employment opportunities and contribute to
he region becoming a main agri-food area. There was a complete
isﬁt between the arguments of the public ofﬁcials embedded in
he conﬁguration Innovative, sustainable mega company in our area
nd the beliefs, fears, and expectations of a large number of citizens,
mbedded in No mega stable in our area. Because both conﬁgura-
ions were characterized by ﬁxated beliefs, interactions between
hem did not result in new learning.
As the decision-making process advanced, the misﬁt between
he two conﬂicting conﬁgurations deepened and resulted in a sit-
ation where both groups became entirely ﬁxated on their own
nterpretations and meanings. This process was reinforced by the
upporting national conﬁgurations. If a new concern was raised, the
ocal government, with the help of the conﬁguration NMC as mega
ustainable,  responded by announcing new (scientiﬁc) research to
nvestigate the matter. Time and again it used research outcomes
o try to dispel the citizens’ doubts and mitigate the uncertainties
hat they saw. However, in the eyes of the citizens, these research
utcomes were just more of the same: biased statements to bol-
ter the pro-conﬁguration’s own ideas. Supported by Mega stable as
ega wrong,  the local protestors reacted to every new analysis withnal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 39– 47 43
counter-arguments, saying that they could not simply set aside all
the uncertainties involved in the project.
The core difference between both conﬁgurations boiled down
to a different scale perspective on the project [49]. The local gov-
ernment made sense of their favorable views about the NMC  by
referring to the beneﬁts of the mega company for the entire region
or even for the country. To them, the NMC  would contribute to
sustainability because less sustainable stables in other parts of
the country would disappear, making room for nature projects in
those areas. Furthermore, the NMC  would stimulate innovation and
entrepreneurship that could serve as an example to others and
might have positive spin-off effects for the entire agricultural sector
in the Netherlands. The local citizens and lobby groups, however,
reasoned from a local perspective. They highlighted the absence of
positive effects of the project for the local community, emphasizing
the negative side-effects for the immediate neighborhood.
In the end, both groups had strong convictions and ﬁxed beliefs
and expectations about the entire project. And, typically for a con-
frontation of actors with ﬁxed beliefs, they both got the idea that the
other group was  not listening properly or that it did not understood
their position. They stereotyped each other: The supporters were
blamed for being too eager and the opposing parties were blamed
for being too concerned [8]. Strikingly, the regional and national
government actors from the conﬁguration Just follow the procedures
did not take part in the debates. Although they promoted the NMC
and the concentration of livestock in that speciﬁc local area, they
stuck to the belief that it was up to the local government to decide
upon necessary land use plans and permits.
4.3. Spiral of distrust
How did the different interactions and arguments evolve in
the escalation of distrust? In the beginning, people had conﬂicting
beliefs but there was no distrust between local government and
the citizen. However, while the different conﬁgurations became
more and more ﬁxed in their beliefs about the mega stables project,
they also became trapped in a spiral of distrust. This spiral started
with both conﬁgurations blaming each other for not listening or
not wanting to listen.
The spiral of distrust came about through two entwined inter-
action processes that took place simultaneously (Figure 1). In
process A, distrust increased and, in process B, distrust hardened.
The dynamic in process A is based on the idea that, when one
actor is providing information or arguments that sound like good
reasons to him to trust, the other party only ﬁnds in the same
information reasons to doubt and become suspicious (see Section
2.1.). If the ﬁrst actor–in our case the municipality–continues to
offer the same kind of information or arguments, then the sec-
ond party–the citizens–are only conﬁrmed in their doubts and
distrust increases. The dynamic in process B is based on the idea
that, once distrust is triggered between the actors in the differ-
ent conﬁgurations, the conﬁgurations tend to become closed and
the actors become ﬁxated on their own interpretations (see Sec-
tion 2.2.). The consequence is that they start blaming one another
for not wanting to listen anymore. The difference between A and
B is that in process A the parties exchange information about the
content of the policy and base their trust or distrust on that infor-
mation, whereas in process B the source of trust or distrust is not
the content of the policy or the information but the actors’ atti-
tude and role as perceived in one another’s eyes. Clinging to one’s
own position becomes a goal in itself, and the distrust is more
directed at the individuals, rather than at the content of what they
say.
Process A: More information and more debates, meant to build
trust, led to distrust
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. The local government organized several debates, meetings, and
information gatherings to explain the plans and to discuss all
possible worries people might have. However, through these
gatherings, citizens started realizing that the mega stable project
was not the only project being developed in their town; there
was also the construction of the sand-processing factory and the
development of a big greenhouse project. They felt overwhelmed
by all these plans and started protesting against the mega stables.
. In line with modern governance, the local government tried to
be as transparent as possible and provided all conceivable avail-
able information. Instead of support being won by doing this,
it resulted in selective shopping and miscommunication. Every
new research report and every new piece of information that
was meant to mitigate uncertainties was used by the opposition
to highlight the uncertainties instead. Hence, new information,
rather than removing uncertainty, led to more uncertainty.
. The local debates about the NMC  also attracted the attention
of protest organizations and individuals operating nationally,
belonging to the conﬁguration Mega stable as mega wrong.  These
were for example environmental issue groups and some polit-
ical parties with a strong green proﬁle. They affected the local
discussions because they provided the opponents with new
information and arguments, highlighting the negative effects of
mega stables even further.
. As the discussions progressed and the number of people tak-
ing part in them increased, the stakeholders started to simplify
their arguments. They realized that their counterparts did not
interpret the situation in the way they did, and they tried to
strengthen their arguments by using simpler words. In a way,
they cut down the nuances to make for stronger arguments. They
also used simpler arguments to convince the newcomers in the
debating arena. Everyone involved tried to talk about the content
but, because of their different interpretations of the situation, the
discussion became a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ [50]. Arguments andiral of distrust.
counter-arguments were exchanged, but one group was  mainly
emphasizing the beneﬁts of the NMC, whereas the other, the
dangers and the uncertainties. Instead of convincing each other,
both parties ended up using political one-liners and emotive
statements; and in line with the theory, once the uncertain-
ties were being highlighted rather than set aside, the distrust
increased.
Process B: Blaming and perseverance of points of view
1. The growing levels of distrust affected the entire atmosphere
in which the debates and discussions were being held. The
mood changed from discussing the content of the plans and
the information provided to blaming each other for not listen-
ing or misunderstanding each other’s point of view. Instead of
exchanging their arguments about the content, they gradually
closed the doors to deliberation.
2. Every new piece of information was  interpreted negatively. All
suggestions or plans from both sides were met  with suspicion.
The suggestion from the local government, for example, to plant
new trees in the area to compensate for the extra trafﬁc was
discarded by the opponents as yet another attempt to spoil the
open landscape. On the other hand, some of the statements about
public health risks were brushed aside by the local government
as being biased and not scientiﬁc.
3. Both supporters and opponents of the mega stables also exagger-
ated the arguments put forward by the other party–much to the
frustration and indignation of both sides. Public ofﬁcials blamed
the opposing parties for wanting only to frighten the citizens
who  had thus far stayed outside the discussions. The opponents,
on the other hand, exaggerated the plans for the mega stable
by portraying the buildings as high-rise, multi-level, concrete
buildings.
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. In due course, neither party was able to hear any positive argu-
ments from the other. Their mutual distrust had become an
important mental state. This resulted in the disqualiﬁcation of
each other’s input into the discussion and perseverance in cling-
ing to their own interpretations. Giving in to the other would
mean losing out. Distrusting and disqualifying each other’s input
had become a goal in itself.
. Finally, perseverance in clinging to positions resulted in conspir-
acy theories. The alderman responsible for agricultural policies
was a Christian Democrat with an agricultural upbringing, and
according to the opponents he would have defended the agri-
cultural interests against all odds. Traditionally, the Christian
Democratic Party has strong political clout among farmers.
Town-hall ofﬁcials, on the other hand, believed that the oppo-
nents were conspiring with far-leftwing parties and several
environmental interest groups.
The entwined interaction processes teach us that it is not
elf-evident that policymakers can solve the problem of trust in
overnment [15] by organizing information gatherings, or consul-
ation sessions, as often suggested in the trust and social capital
iterature [19]. On the contrary, our analysis shows that these gov-
rnment activities run the risk of losing trust even further [8]. The
rovision of information could trigger a dynamic of distrust at indi-
idual level, when citizens are not swayed by the government’s
rguments, because of a different background of mental states [32].
owever, when the same interaction pattern continues and the
ame type of information is given, the conﬂict may  grow and a
roup dynamic could lead to ﬁxations, and the blaming of individual
ctors [41].
Some argue that ‘healthy’ distrust in government may  be beneﬁ-
ial to society. ‘Democratic systems would institutionalize distrust
y providing many opportunities for citizens to monitor the activ-
ties of the government’ [51, p488]. However, in our case study we
bserve that distrust may  also lead to group processes that result
n ﬁxations and stalemates in the policy processes. In the end, the
ocal government was criticized for not taking the public interest
nto consideration. This, so we believe, is no longer healthy distrust,
nd thus in the next sections we describe how local government
ould prevent spirals of distrust.
.4. Strategies for preventing distrust
How could the local government have prevented this spiral of
istrust? Once a decision-making process escalates and distrust
rises, it is usually very difﬁcult to revitalize the process and regain
rust. Trust comes on foot, but leaves on horseback. But, as argued
n the previous section, preventing this pattern does not necessar-
ly mean that one should increase transparency and produce more
nformation. A successful strategy to avoid the spiral of distrust
tarts at the very least by establishing awareness among policy-
akers and process managers that information and transparency
ould trigger spirals of distrust rather than help to win trust.5
Second, to win trust, it is essential to use arguments that ﬁt
ith people’s set of existing mental states, such as beliefs, expec-
ations, convictions, anxieties, and fears [25]. These mental states
re constantly being developed, renewed, and discarded within the
onﬁguration in which people live. A ﬁrst step for governments to
ollow, then, is to identify beforehand the different conﬁgurations
urrounding a policy issue.
Third, governments should be very aware of their own  conﬁg-
ration and identify their blind spots. They could, for instance,
ppoint a devil’s advocate who criticizes a government’s inter-
retations and tries to identify other perspectives. The political
pposition on the city council tried to play this role, but they too
ere part of a conﬁguration and thus part of the same dynamic.nal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 39– 47 45
An independent third party, then, could be helpful, because in the
interactions between public ofﬁcials and citizens there is always
a chance of a certain interpretation becoming dominant, right
from the start, excluding other perspectives. The devil’s advocate
can continually try to ascertain which points of view are being
excluded, either consciously or subconsciously. Broad consensus
or a lot of support for a speciﬁc policy plan are signals for such
a dominant interpretation. Usually this means that plans are too
good to be true.
Fourth, we  argue that, for trusting, there is no need for others
to agree with the reasons a person gives for trusting or distrusting
something or somebody. Neither is it necessary for one’s reason-
ing to be based on rational argumentation (although it could).
Therefore it is important that governments try to respect mental
states that differ from their own. Stereotyping citizens as unin-
formed people, disqualifying arguments as not being based on
facts, and refuting concerns because they are driven by emotions
only, do not help to build trust; on the contrary, they breed dis-
trust.
A possible ﬁfth strategy is to organize one’s own moments
of reﬂection. Case studies such as ours always provide backward
glances, and in retrospect it is easy to pinpoint what went wrong,
and what was overlooked. However, in the heat of policy processes,
most people are not able to reﬂect on what is going on. To cite Mead:
‘we are always conscious of what we have done, never of doing it’
[52,p.136]. Scheduling ﬁxed moments of reﬂection during intensive
decision-making processes can help to anticipate these moments
of blindness.
Sixth, an essential part of winning trust is communicating prop-
erly. Discussing uncertainties can help stakeholders to sidestep
uncertainties and establish trust. On the other hand however, our
case study shows that distributing all information randomly can
have serious negative consequences for the process. Organiza-
tional studies show that more information is ‘not what people
need if they are overwhelmed by equivocality’ [29,p. 27]. Instead,
they need alternative communication arrangements that focus on
values and priorities, and which could clarify one another’s prefer-
ences, to show what really matters to them [29]. In sensitive policy
processes, governments should, for instance, stop organizing infor-
mation exchange gatherings. These gatherings are usually seen as a
one-way communication from government to citizen, adding only
to the spread of suspicion and distrust.
5. Discussion and conclusions
On the basis of an evaluation of a decision-making process about
an NMC  project in a small Dutch town, this article analyzed how
distrust came about and evolved during a decision-making process
about mega stables.
First, we elaborated the broader context of citizens’ trust in
modern society. Due to rising uncertainties, continuously changing
networks, conﬂicting expectations about government operations,
and the growing amount of information and disinformation, gov-
ernments increasingly face trouble in building and maintaining
citizens’ trust. It has become increasingly unclear what the gen-
eral public interest is. Making public policies about controversial
subjects such as the construction of housing for intensive farming
proved to be even more difﬁcult.
Second, we  developed a theoretical framework for analyzing
processes of building and losing trust. When complex questions
with high levels of uncertainty are involved, citizens need encour-
agements to suspend uncertainties and take the ﬁnal leap into trust.
To win  trust, it is essential that these encouragements ﬁt with peo-
ple’s set of existing mental states [25]. This was  not the case in
our study. We  observed a complete misﬁt between the arguments
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ublic ofﬁcials used and the expectations of large numbers of citi-
ens. This ﬁnally resulted in distrust.
Third, our case study illustrates that gaining trust for an inno-
ative concept like a New Mixed Company needs more than
ust the provision of information. Randomly distributed informa-
ion was used to highlight the uncertainties of the policy, rather
han to help overcome them. More information is not always
ood [22]–especially in situations, as in our case, where sus-
icion is already looming. Although the risk analysis literature
as already taught us that the provision of information or (sci-
ntiﬁc) research about innovations could cause distrust [53,54],
hese conclusions remain counter-intuitive for most policymakers
ecause they do not expect these distorted effects of transparency
cf.[22]).
Fourth, in much of the deliberative governance literature it is
elieved that more participation will increase trust [19,55]. Our
valuation of the case study shows, however, that this is not always
he case. New actors introduced new interpretations of the situa-
ion, and this resulted in a further emphasis on the uncertainties
nvolved. This conclusion ﬁts into studies that highlight the difﬁ-
ulty of relating trust to public participation in decision making
56–58]. On top of that we revealed the problem of the temporal
isﬁt. Initially, citizens were not interested in information gather-
ngs about vague plans. The citizens’ involvement began only when
he building plans became more concrete. By that stage however,
he entrepreneurs and policymakers had already passed the point
f no return.
Fifth, we observed a spiral of distrust consisting of two  entwined
nteraction processes that took place simultaneously. In the ﬁrst
rocess, the amount of distrust increased, and in the second,
istrust hardened. In the ﬁrst process, people were still talking
bout the content of the policy, although these discussions led
o an increasing rather than a decreasing number of uncertain-
ies, whereas in the second process people stopped exchanging
heir arguments about the content and gradually started blam-
ng one another for not wanting to listen and closing doors to
uccessful deliberations. Inductively, a more general theory of
scalating distrust during decision-making processes was  formu-
ated.
Sixth, our case study also showed that governments can prevent
pirals of trust by discerning the different kinds of conﬁgurations,
ncluding their own, organizing moments of reﬂection during the
olicymaking process, and communicating in various ways rather
han only exchanging information through information gatherings.
hese ﬁndings concur with the latest studies in the literature on
rust and process management [18].
Finally, the mega stable discussion in this town was one of the
rst public debates on the establishment of mega stables in the
etherlands. The controversy about this type of stable is exemplary
f the many controversies regarding intensive livestock farming.
ntensive farming is a dilemma for local municipalities because on
he one hand they are supposed to further the interests of their
ocal constituents, but on the other hand they are also asked to
romote sustainability that goes beyond their town borders. How-
ver, as we have seen in our case study, this is not simply a matter
f NIMBY behavior: It is a debate with all kinds of conﬂicting val-
es, interests, and interpretations. Comparable conclusions were
ound in relation to the construction of mega greenhouse clusters
n Flanders [59] and wind-energy [60]. Our analysis clearly shows
hat a fruitful dialogue starts at the very least with an overview of
he different conﬁgurations and a serious investigation of the dif-
erent potential conﬂicts between these conﬁgurations. Only after
uch investigations may  conﬂicts be discussed without losing trust.
owever, note that a debate with different stakes and interests
oes not guarantee that all parties will be satisﬁed or happy with
he outcomes of the debate, the conclusion, and the decisions that
[
[
[nal of Life Sciences 66 (2013) 39– 47
a government makes after the debating is over. Parties, both gov-
ernment and non-government, may  disagree and have conﬂicts,
but could still trust one another. In any case, blindly providing
information and involving stakeholders in just another ‘broad soci-
etal debate’ is not effective and might lead to spirals of distrust, as
illustrated in this article.
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